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Rigor or rhetoric: Public philosopher and public in dialogue  
Abstract 
Brian Leiter (2016) throws down two gauntlets to philosophers engaged in dialogue with 
the broader public. If, with the first, public philosophers recognize that they cannot offer 
substantive answers but only sophisticated method, they nevertheless fail to realize that 
said method does not resonate with the very public whom they purport to help. For, with 
the second, that method does not engage the emotivist and tribalist cast of contemporary 
public discourse: emotivist because a person’s moral and political beliefs are a function 
of emotional attitudes or affective responses for which she adduces reasons post hoc; 
tribalist because the person tracks not the inferential relation between beliefs but her 
similarity with interlocutors. In order to understand the full extent of this critique, it is 
necessary, first, to parse strands of public philosophy, distinct discursive sites, and 
pictures of philosophical practice and, then, to probe the critique’s empirical 
groundedness and intended scope. These elements in place, it is then possible to sketch 
public philosophy reconceived along Leiter’s lines as equal part rigor and rhetoric. That 
sketch may be somewhat filled out through two tactics employed in Jeffrey Stout’s (2004, 
2010) work. These form part of a toolkit for philosophical dialogue whereby philosophers 
get a discursive grip on non-discursive factors underlying public discourse and push back 
on Leiter's dilemma. 
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Rigor or rhetoric: Public philosopher and public in dialogue  
0. Introduction 
Brian Leiter (2016) undercuts familiar versions of public philosophy. Accordingly, I first 
put forward three strands of public philosophy as well as two standard pictures of 
philosophical practice, one naïve, the other sophisticated and compare versions and 
pictures across two deliberative sites. I next sketch Leiter’s two paradoxes of public 
philosophy and show how emotivism and tribalism undermine the standard pictures and 
motivate a revised picture, the lucid. I then briefly press questions regarding the two 
paradoxes’ empirical grounding as well as their scope. Lastly, I assume that this picture 
obtains and appeal to Jeffrey Stout’s (2004, 2010) work to show how philosophical 
dialogue, through pressure on the person’s self-image as “decent” or “reasonable” and 
appeal to “moral perceptions”, may yet influence public discourse. 
1. Public philosophy: three strands, two sites, two pictures 
For the sake of clarity, I define the key ideas of Leiter’s (2016) overview of public 
philosophy. I begin with the notion of “public philosophy”, three strands of which are 
present in the paper. Leiter is concerned foremost with a restricted sense: 
(D1) “Neoliberal” public philosophy is the practice of bringing rigorous 
philosophical reasoning (e.g. deductive argument, conceptual analysis, appeal 
to linguistic usage or intuition, etc.) to bear on more or less urgent matters of 
direct or indirect interest to persons or groups in society with the aim of 
impacting public policy. 
This strand qualifies as “neoliberal” in that it exemplifies a “way of thinking that has 
dominated the capitalist world completely since the 1980s, in which every human activity 
justifies itself by its contribution to something for which there is demand in the 
marketplace” (Leiter, 2016, p. 51). Put differently, “neoliberal” public philosophy aims 
to supply philosophical rigor in response to a demand for philosophical expertise, whether 
that demand be internal (university or department assessing “impact” or “relevance”) or 
external (public or private sector seeking expert opinion).  
Although Leiter’s attention is squarely on this “neoliberal” strand, his account makes 
room for two further strands. He briefly alludes to:  
(D2) “Broad” public philosophy is the practice of exposing members of the 
public to rigorous philosophical reasoning (e.g. deductive argument, conceptual 
analysis, appeal to linguistic usage or intuition, etc.)  and general philosophical 
conclusions on a range of topics of “public interest” with the aim of promoting 
critical reflection on the public’s part.  
In truth, the author might dub this strand “tautological”: all philosophy is public 
philosophy in the sense that it is “relevant and significant to anyone – including 
presumably members of the ‘public’ – who want to know what is true or to know what 
they do and do not know” (idem.). By his lights, this is, however, “obviously not what is 
meant by ‘public philosophy’” (idem.). As Leiter’s critique seeks to undercut (D1), I 
assume in the following that, to his mind, this leaves (D2) relatively intact. I question this 
assumption in the last part of §2. 
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Lastly, a third and final strand is left standing:  
(D3) “Narrow” public philosophy is the practice of deploying forms of 
philosophical rhetoric (e.g. evocative description, historical understanding, 
causal explanation, critical genealogy, utopian appeals, etc.) to bear on more or 
less urgent matters of direct or indirect interest to persons or groups in society 
independent of any aim to impact public policy. 
I label this strand “narrow” as opposed to “broad” because Leiter attempts to show how 
a practical but chastened “neoliberal” public philosophy finds more solid footing: first, 
by decoupling “public philosophy” and “public policy” (p. 62); second, by calling 
attention to the rhetorical practices of past philosophers of public stature, notably, Marx 
and Nietzsche (p. 64). In a word, understanding why (D1) misleads us as to what 
philosophy may accomplish helps us better to define aims and manage expectations for 
(D3).  
A significant challenge to understanding Leiter’s account is the vagueness latent in (D1). 
While the definition says much about what the neoliberal public philosopher wishes to 
accomplish and which discursive means she employs, it leaves indeterminate where she 
undertakes her task, to whom she addresses herself and how and whether she interacts 
with the addressees. For the author paints in broad strokes: the neoliberal public 
philosopher engages in “public debate” (pp. 53, 55, 62), “public discourse” (pp. 59, 62, 
63) or “moral thinking in the public sphere” (p. 62) and addresses simply “the public” 
(pp. 51, 64). Yet this leaves unclear whether the discourse is uni-, bi- or multidirectional, 
whether there is the opportunity for default-and-challenge interactions, whether the 
speakers, participants, etc. claim philosophical or other expertise, whether a specific goal 
is to be attained (e.g. consensus, convergence of opinion, etc.) and so on.  
Undoubtedly, Leiter is aware of that vagueness. In fact, his specific examples may 
somewhat close the gap. Regardless, I propose two discursive sites whereto Leiter’s 
critique may be addressed and wherein its reach may be assessed: 
(S1) A “pedagogical” discursive site involves a (more or less) formal 
unidirectional exchange between a public philosopher and an audience 
comprising philosophical lay persons, public officials, experts, stakeholders, 
etc., with interaction (mostly) confined to questions and answers and taking 
place within a limited timeframe. This site aims at educating and informing the 
audience. 
(S2) A “interactive” discursive site involves a formal or informal bi- or 
multidirectional exchange between a public philosopher and an audience 
comprising philosophical lay persons, public officials, experts, stakeholders, 
etc., with interaction taking the form of presentations followed by questions and 
answers or a feedback session of comments and challenges, etc. and taking place 
within a (more or less) limited timeframe. This site aims at a joint learning 
experience for philosopher and audience. 
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I do not pretend to have exhausted the conceptual range of possible discursive sites1, nor 
claim that a discursive site cannot be alternately pedagogical and interactive. These are 
merely rough-and-ready distinctions with some basis in the text and which allow us to 
get a better grip on Leiter’s central claims. 
Finally, before moving on to the substance of Leiter’s challenge, I also give two standard 
pictures of neoliberal public philosophy to illustrate how it might be practiced by the 
public philosopher in (S1) and (S2): 
(P1) Naïve: Public philosophy involves using abstract reasoning to generate 
substantive (normative) principles which are straightforwardly applied to 
problems facing persons or groups in society.2  
(P2) Sophisticated: Public philosophy involves using abstract reasoning to 
distinguish unlike arguments, concepts, cases, etc. and to bring clearer into view 
underdetermined norms, aspirations, ideals, etc. and their range of applicability, 
without issuing in a straightforward resolution of problems facing persons or 
groups in society.3 
To illustrate briefly how neoliberal public philosophy may differ between discursive sites 
and pictures, consider two philosophers, Alberta and Bernadette. Suppose that Alberta is 
participating in (S1) on the subject of healthcare rationing. As a “pedagogical” discursive 
site, this exchange may foresee a presentation from Alberta before opening the floor to 
questions from public officials, experts, stakeholders or lay persons. In her presentation, 
Alberta works from the norm of equity to argue for a healthcare lottery and grounds her 
claims in her philosophical expertise. In her answers, she is adamant that equity is our 
predominant concern and that a healthcare lottery is its only suitable institutionalization. 
For Alberta, the takeaway concerns her success in persuading her audience that the norm 
of equity and a lottery healthcare represent the best solution in healthcare-rationing. 
In contrast, Bernadette is participating in (S2). As an “interactive” discursive site, this 
exchange may take the form of a roundtable or moderated discussion. In her opening 
words, Bernadette identifies competing norms, such as efficiency, equity and maximin, 
to argue for a balanced allocation strategy but does not consider that her philosophical 
training lends her any special “authority” (cf. Rawls, 2007, pp. 1-2). Moreover, in her 
subsequent interventions, Bernadette remains sensitive to novel uses and unforeseen 
shortcomings of those norms which follow-up remarks may bring to her attention and in 
light of which her initial survey must be further articulated and supplemented. For 
Bernadette, the takeaway lies in getting discussion started on a multifaceted issue and 
                                                        
1 Other discursive sites might take shape as hearings collecting expert testimony to inform problem-solving or 
think-pieces aiming to generate societal uptake of a question of broad philosophical interest to the “maxi-public” 
(Suiter and Reuchamps, 2016).   
2 Although there may be no public philosophers practicing the “naïve” picture, it forms the target of Leiter’s first 
paradox. While it might thus be considered an “empty” concept, we can get an idea of what such a view might 
look like in Daniels’s (1996, pp. 334-338) report on “principlism” and the critical discussion surrounding 
Beauchamp’s and Childress’s (1979) four principles for bioethics. In later editions, the latter repudiated their 
simplistic view. 
3 More philosophers would second this picture. One prominent example is Williams (1994) wherein he expresses 
a parallel view about moral philosophy. See also Daniels (1996) on top-down versus bottom-up approaches in 
bioethics. 
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jumpstarting “collective intelligence” (Landemore 2012) to test possible solutions against 
differently weighted priorities. 
From the above contrast, it is clearer to what extent the discursive site and the picture of 
public philosophy influence the shape of any given instance of neoliberal public 
philosophy. Were we to place Alberta in (S2) and Bernadette in (S1), the interaction’s 
tenor and stakes would prove importantly different. For Alberta, the takeaway would 
instead consist in identifying lingering questions and concerns which the norm of equity 
and its proposed solution, a healthcare lottery, must confront in order to be the most 
broadly convincing, adequate solution. For Bernadette, the takeaway would lie rather in 
showing her audience the importance of approaching the topic of healthcare rationing 
from different perspectives. Wherefore the need to supplement the original paper by 
calling attention to the interaction between speaker and place, time and purpose, in 
determining outcomes (see Table 1). Yet, whatever the site or context, Leiter holds that 
neoliberal public philosophy falls prey to two paradoxes, the subject of §2.  
 
Table 1: Outcomes of coupling between discursive sites and pictures 
 (P1) Naïve (P2) Sophisticated 
(S1) Pedagogical Persuasion Diversity education 
(S2) Interactive Enhancing persuasion Collective intelligence 
 
 
2. Leiter’s challenge: Two paradoxes and the third picture 
Leiter (2016) formulates two paradoxes targeting any contribution of “philosophical 
insight or knowledge or skill to questions of moral and political urgency” in a community 
(p. 51). The first holds that what expertise philosophers “offer can not [sic] consist in any 
credible claim to know what is good, right, valuable, or any other substantive normative 
proposition that might be decisive in practical affairs” (p. 53). If philosophers cannot offer 
credible knowledge claims on substantive matters, Alberta’s initial claim and subsequent 
insistence that equity is our only concern in healthcare rationing and that a healthcare 
lottery is its only suitable institutionalization come into question. Because she subscribes 
to (P1), the naïve, she holds that substantive normative principles straightforwardly 
generate solutions to society’s problems. Yet her claim and insistence seem misplaced 
should she lack credible knowledge claims on substantive matters. Hence, by casting 
doubt on just such knowledge claims, the first paradox undermines (P1) and, 
consequently, Alberta’s neoliberal public philosophy.  
All the same, this leaves (P2), the sophisticated, untouched, as well as Bernadette’s 
efforts. For the credibility of Bernadette’s public intervention hinges not on a knowledge 
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claim of substantive matters but on the skilled deployment of reasoning and abstract 
theory to distinguish cases and explicate implicit norms, etc. For Leiter, (P2) is similarly 
undercut by building on the first paradox. He grants that, even without substantive 
normative knowledge, philosophers may offer “a method or way of thinking” (idem.). 
From a set of beliefs, philosophers work out rational commitments, e.g. believing x 
commits one to y but not to z. This “discursive hygiene” involves “parsing arguments, 
clarifying the concepts at play in a debate, teasing out the dialectical entailments of 
suppositions and claims” (idem.). The paradox lies in that such hygiene, public 
philosophers’ nominal contribution, plays “an only erratic, and highly contingent, role in 
how people form beliefs about matters of moral and political urgency” (p. 55).  
Thus, Bernadette’s contribution is similarly built on sand. For, if the form of her 
intervention does not directly engage the processes behind belief- and attitude-formation 
and, therefore, does not stimulate concerted reflection, problematization and collective 
problem-solving, Bernadette’s approach of parsing competing notions and remaining 
sensitive to novel uses is unsuited for, if not irrelevant to, the outcomes which she seeks 
in the wake of her intervention. From the lack of fit between the form of her intervention 
and the mechanisms guiding belief- and attitude-formation, it follows that the second 
paradox undermines (P2) and, by extension, Bernadette’s version of public philosophy. 
If the two paradoxes can be sustained, public philosophy would have to be reconceived, 
notably as (D3). But therein lies the rub. To sustain the paradoxes, Leiter must at once 
elaborate the mechanisms guiding belief- and attitude-formation and bulwark (D2), broad 
public philosophy, against those mechanisms’ reach. I first consider his elaborating 
before returning to the “bulwarking” at the end of this section. 
Leiter fleshes those mechanisms out through the psychological phenomena of emotivism 
and tribalism. Emotivism limits public philosophy as “discursive hygiene”: “Ethical 
disagreements are at bottom a function of disagreement in attitudes, rather than 
disagreements about beliefs” (p. 53).4 He adds that “the connection between particular 
facts and our attitudes is just a contingent psychological/causal fact” such that, “if our 
beliefs change, our attitudes often change too” (p. 54). Accordingly, public discourse may 
concern two kinds of conflict. If between beliefs, the conflict may be ended by ensuring 
convergence between beliefs through appeal to reasons. If between attitudes, the conflict 
admits of no clear-cut solution as attitudes are less reason-responsive. 
This warrants Leiter’s seeming conclusion that no rules govern the necessary 
transformation of and causal interaction between beliefs and attitudes. For a given belief 
may provoke change in another belief or attitude without one’s being aware thereof. 
Likewise, one may mistakenly attribute change in a given belief to another belief or 
attitude. There is no available conceptual apparatus for reliably tracking and predicting 
those causal connections. That being said, one wonders whether Leiter overstates his case 
regarding the absence of rules. 
Two points bear mentioning. First, in fairness to Leiter, nowhere does the author 
explicitly state that there are no rules governing “changes in belief about the logical or 
inferential relations between beliefs or between beliefs and attitudes” (p. 55). Certainly, 
this conclusion might follow from his observation that discursive hygiene operates 
“through causal channels we do not yet understand very well” (p. 63), but the phrase “no 
                                                        
4 Leiter associates this position with “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement” in Stevenson (1963). 
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rules” only appears in a passage recalling Philippa Foot’s (1958) criticism of Stevenson. 
Although Leiter then remarks that “Stevenson had it exactly right” about the contingent, 
psychological character of changes in belief, this does not strictly commit the author to 
the “no rules” view.   
For, moving to our second point, Leiter could admit the existence of rules governing 
“changes in belief about the logical or inferential relations between beliefs or between 
beliefs and attitudes” all while maintaining that, for practical purposes, there are none. It 
would suffice that such changes are causally overdetermined. Put differently, even if there 
are rules, one may be hard-pressed to know which to invoke in order to explain a given 
change5, without simultaneously appealing to one’s own “pro- and con- attitudes about 
the kinds of arguments that influence attitudes” (Leiter, 2016, p. 54). 
An example may help clarify this point. Suppose a person believes that the electoral 
system is unjust due to her moral beliefs about autonomy, religious beliefs about temporal 
power or social attitudes about democratic politics. To change this larger belief, one might 
try several strategies. One appeals to ethical considerations counter to her moral or 
religious beliefs (e.g. the temporal-spiritual power divide is necessary), to unethical 
considerations about her self-interest (e.g. the electoral system best preserves her own 
(group’s) freedom of belief) or to opposed social attitudes (e.g. a sense of public service). 
If the person then believes the electoral system just, there are several prima facie possible 
explanations of that change in belief, only some of which owe to discursive factors. The 
change might also owe to non-discursive factors, such as sociological determinants (e.g. 
tipping points) or cognitive biases identified by experimental psychology (e.g. 
elaboration likelihood model). Moreover, recall that the person herself may be unaware 
of or mistaken about the belief which provoked the change.  
Resultantly, neither person nor interlocutor nor observer will be able to ascribe 
conclusively the change to the discursive factor of philosophical reasoning (e.g. ethical 
considerations) rather than other discursive factors (e.g. self-interest or social attitudes) 
or even non-discursive factors (e.g. biases). While it may still prove possible 
retrospectively to advance different, more or less plausible hypotheses regarding the 
change, this does not affect the substance of Leiter’s claim, only its details. 
With this, the author turns to “tribalism”, the view that “the propensity of creatures like 
us to identify with those ‘like themselves,’ and to view others as unacceptably different, 
deficient, depraved, and perhaps dangerous” ensures that “prejudice and bias are 
dominant forces in human life” (p. 59). Tribalism directly impacts discursive hygiene and 
public discourse in three ways. First, the person tracks not the inferential relation between 
beliefs, attitudes and reasons but her similarity with interlocutors. Second, she is 
predisposed to adopt divergent discursive stances towards similar and dissimilar 
interlocutors. In just the same measure that she is more likely to accept a similar person’s 
beliefs, attitudes and reasons as good and deem the latter a rational actor or a locus of 
human dignity, she is more likely to dismiss a dissimilar person’s beliefs, etc. as bad and 
to view the other as irrational or unworthy of dignity. Third, unremarked by Leiter, her 
beliefs, attitudes and reasons are most responsive to pressure coming from those similar 
                                                        
5 A parallel lesson may be drawn from the political science institutionalist literature explaining the rules or 
mechanisms governing institutional changes (cf. Hall and Taylor, 1996). Given multiple explanatory models, a 
phenomenon might be explained by one or more of them or even none at all (cf. Schmidt, 2010). The history of 
ideas may also be read in this way.  
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to herself, yet those similar to herself are least likely to pressure her on her beliefs, etc., 
whether due to self-sorting, group polarization (Sunstein 2002), etc.. 
Again, an example may help. Consider a person who believes that a progressive income 
tax is just, be it for moral reasons about fairness, religious reasons about charity or social 
attitudes about wealth. At the level of belief- and attitude-formation, according to 
tribalism, she will judge the taxation system fair insofar as it benefits those similar to 
herself and penalizes the dissimilar, for the former alone deserve her moral concern. At 
the discursive level, were another to challenge her belief that the taxation system is just 
or her supporting attitudes or reasons, the likelihood of her engaging that challenge hinges 
on that person’s similarity with herself.  
In sum, if “moral change depends fundamentally on the emotional attitudes” and “these 
attitudes tend in a strongly Tribalist direction” (Leiter, 2016, p. 60), discursive hygiene 
must overcome attitudinal recalcitrance and sensitivity to (dis)similarity. Despite his 
vigorous critique, Leiter maintains that public philosophy can move forward, albeit under 
other garb. One can hold without contradiction that a.) philosophers ought to apply theory 
to urgent matters and b.) public philosophers are most likely to broaden persons’ regard 
for others when they appeal to emotions and similarity, not inferential connections 
between beliefs, attitudes and reasons. Discursive hygiene may still indirectly track 
beliefs and attitudes’ evolution, and the discipline of law suggests that logical entailments 
can constrain attitudes when rationalizing one’s position (pp. 62-63). Rhetoric does not 
obviate rigor, yielding a revised picture: 
(P3) Lucid: Public philosophy involves using a.) abstract reasoning to generate 
substantive (normative) principles, to distinguish unlike arguments, etc., to bring 
into view undetermined norms, etc., in the hope that this may constrain 
acceptable attitudes and b.) rhetoric to engage non-discursive, emotional or 
similarity-based factors underlying belief- and attitude-formation.  
This “lucid” picture enables us to shift from (D1), neoliberal public philosophy, with its 
focus on influencing public policy to (D3), narrow public philosophy, with its emphasis 
on philosophical rhetoric (e.g. evocative description, historical understanding, etc.) with, 
nonetheless, particular attention to urgent matters. 
To illustrate (P3), consider a third philosopher, Christiane, participating in (S1), a 
pedagogical site, on healthcare rationing. Christiane adopts a threefold strategy regarding 
her audience. First, she identifies competing norms, e.g. efficiency, equity and maximin, 
to formulate a balanced allocation strategy. Second, she recognizes that others desire 
principles to justify their belief and that, should no felicitous principles emerge or there 
be conflict with overarching legal or technical rules, they may be amenable to revising 
that belief. Third, she appeals to emotions in order to elicit opposed affective reactions.  
Before moving on to the final section, I should briefly assess two issues set aside above. 
On one hand, does Leiter provide sufficient evidence to back his claim that public 
discourse is subject to emotivism and tribalism, and how well does his description fit 
everyday experience? On the other, how successful is Leiter in bulwarking (P2), broad 
public philosophy, against the two paradoxes undercutting (P1), neoliberal public 
philosophy? 
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As to the first, Leiter’s evidence that public life is insensitive to discursive hygiene falls 
short of systematicity. To establish his emotivism claim, he at times references findings 
from moral psychology about the sources of moral judgment and motivation (pp. 57-59), 
which gesture towards affect-motivation or affect-morals internalism. At others, the 
evidence is more observational, even anecdotal: the Steven Salaita controversy; Hindu 
nationalist fabrications; the argumentative merits of Peter Singer’s (1975) case for animal 
liberation and his international reception; Legal Realist judicial practice (Leiter, 2016, pp. 
55-57, 61-62, 63). To motivate his tribalism claims, Leiter advances similarly mixed 
considerations. In places, he appeals to selectionist explanations from the natural 
selection literature to understand tribalism’s hold over human nature (p. 60). In others, 
the claim that tribalism is “the curse of our species” rests on historical narrative about the 
post-1945 world-order and remarks on the Marxian ideal of species-being (p. 59).  
I will just briefly suggest two ways in which Leiter’s claims about emotivism may lack 
sufficient warrant. First, more time could be spent fleshing out the precise interrelation 
between “social intuitionist” moral judgment, moral-emotional processing and 
sentimentalism. Second, Leiter’s observational evidence might be opposed by further 
observational evidence. Supposing that there are instances of public discourse wherein 
participants put forward arguments structured in terms of abstract reasoning and hold one 
another to account on grounds of consistency, etc., this suggests that the public is, at the 
very least, not wholly insensitive to discursive hygiene (though still short of highly 
sensitive).6 Leiter would undoubtedly reply that such evidence is compatible with his 
emotivist charge inasmuch as consistency factors not into how participants form their 
beliefs but, instead, into how they relate the reasons adduced for their affective responses. 
That said, this suggests that Leiter’s case regarding the public is easily overstated. 
Concerning the second question, namely whether (P2), holds its ground against the two 
paradoxes undercutting (P1), one wonders whether Leiter does not understate his case as 
regards philosophy and philosophers on two counts. On one hand, although the two 
paradoxes seemingly afflict (P1) alone, it is unclear why they do not also undercut (P2) 
whereof the primary tool is also discursive hygiene. If the author’s charge is that the 
public is not insensitive to discursive hygiene solely in urgent moral or political matters 
of public policy but to discursive hygiene tout court, then (P2) is as affected by the second 
paradox. To counter this, he would need to show that affect does not factor into judgment 
about reality, knowledge, etc. and that emotivism and tribalism are confined to “how 
people form beliefs about matters of moral and political urgency” (p. 55). Otherwise, 
other fields of philosophy, e.g. metaphysics, aesthetics, will prove no less relevant to the 
public. In a word, a scope problem looms in Leiter’s account. 
In fact, this problem suggests a second, more troubling worry. If emotivism shapes, at the 
very least, belief- and attitude-formation about moral and political matters, then the two 
paradoxes apply, albeit in a lesser measure, to philosophical discourse with philosophers. 
Leiter is seemingly cognizant of this difficulty: “That this rather obvious point [that 
Singer’s claim that suffering per se is abhorrent, regardless of species, is a matter of brute 
moral attitude] is not much acknowledged in the philosophical literature should make 
even philosophers wonder what role discursive rationality as opposed to other forces are 
playing in their arguments” (p. 61). Combined with his discussion about the absence of 
“rationally obligatory” beliefs (p. 62), this brief acknowledgement makes it curious that 
                                                        
6 As pointed out by one conference participant, the debate surrounding the May 2018 Ireland abortion referendum 
showed that the public did not simply emote but also gave arguments resembling a sort of “guerrilla philosophy”.   
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he restricts the paradoxes to dialogue with the public and thereby invites a species of 
philosophical prejudice. That is, barring this isolated remark, one might come away with 
the impression that philosophers are rational superbeings, masters of discursive hygiene, 
rather than fallible creatures having studied reasoning and abstract theory. It would be 
worth considering the merits of exposing the public to specifically philosophical virtues, 
e.g. discursive hygiene, through such strategies as growing philosophy programs in 
schools.7 
Tribalism is no less a problem in philosophy. For one can point to how considerations of 
similarity may factor into the philosophical equivalent of ideological purity tests, be this 
in terms of one’s intuitions (regarding one’s answer to, say, Putnam’s (1975) Twin Earth 
experiment or Goldman’s (1976) fake barn case) or one’s political leanings. Similarly, 
one might worry about clientelism in hiring or conference invitations. Regardless, to 
answer questions about emotivism and tribalism within philosophy would require a 
sociology of the discipline.8 
3. Public philosophy after Leiter’s paradoxes: Two tactics 
For the sake of illustration, grant that Leiter has matters right. This means that: a.) on 
reflection, one finds that his approach accurately describes and introspectively fits  
everyday experience; b.) emotivism and tribalism withstand common objections (e.g. the 
Frege-Geach problem9). Using Stout’s (2004, 2010) work, I now sketch two tacks which 
a public philosopher might employ in (D3) to influence public discourse on (P3), the 
“lucid” picture.  
The first consists in accepting the phenomenon of post-hoc rationalization and in 
managing one’s discursive expectations. Stout (2010) elaborates a typology of opposition 
to same-sex marriage which may serve a similar purpose (p. 533). He outlines how the 
beliefs of religious opponents to same-sex marriage may be analyzed by the role that 
reasons play in rationalizing their opposition. “Sadistic homophobes” use religious 
rationalization wittingly as a cover for the emotional attitude motivating their opposition. 
They are not tracking reasons for that opposition, and, consequently, they will not react 
to pressure from reasons. As “trolls”, they are playing a game rather than seeking better 
informed or more adequate beliefs. In short, public philosophy, either as discursive 
hygiene or rhetoric, will not reach them. 
In contrast, “unwitting homophobes” use religious rationalization, unbeknownst to 
themselves, as a cover for the emotional attitude motivating their opposition. They are 
not tracking reasons for that opposition, but they may react to pressure from the right kind 
of reasons in that they are hateful but unaware of their rationalizations as such. They 
consider themselves “decent” or “reasonable” and desire to continue regarding 
themselves as such, providing an argumentative foothold for rhetorical pressure, in 
                                                        
7 For what it is worth, Leiter would in all likelihood maintain that the impression is mistaken and that he himself 
favors expanding the discipline in this way. After all, his account only implies a difference of degree between 
philosophers and philosophical lay persons, not one of kind, and one would do well to remember that he advocates 
the continued public use of “discursive hygiene” in (D3). 
8 For one such attempt, see Rhode’s (2017) study finding that articles in leading philosophical journals practice 
persuasion (rather than inquiry or discovery) dialogue. Leiter (2016) himself cites a work of sociological 
importance, Brandt (1959) (p. 54).  
9 Of which the author is aware (p. 54, n. 8).  
  
 
11 
appeals to their “decency” or “reasonableness” (or even face-to-face interaction with a 
person whom they otherwise condemn).  
Lastly, “well-intentioned opponents”, though not homophobic, have a negative emotional 
attitude and find religious teachings a plausible explanation therefor. For these opponents, 
“reasons are playing a greater role in the formation of their political position in the first 
place” (idem.). Accordingly, even if they are mistaken on the reasons for their opposition, 
their opposition tracks reasons rather than (or in addition to) affective responses or 
similarity. Hence, well-intentioned opponents are more responsive to pressure on the 
reasons for their opposition. Through reason-giving, one “show[s] them that their 
scriptural reasons for opposing same-sex marriage fail to cohere with other commitments 
they hold with equal or greater confidence” (idem.). Public discourse can accommodate 
post-hoc rationalization provided that interlocutors distinguish the kinds of ill-
intentioned, mis-intentioned or well-intentioned reasons adduced and adjust their 
expectations and tactics (see Table 2).10  
 
Table 2: Summary of anti-homophobia discursive strategies 
 Homophobic? Aware of 
rationalization? 
Successful 
engagement? 
Sadistic 
homophobe 
Yes Yes None 
Unwitting 
homophobe 
Yes No Pressure on sense of 
decency or 
reasonableness 
Well-intentioned 
opponent 
No - Reason-giving 
 
As to the second tack, one might take an instrumental view of discursive hygiene: 
successfully applying rhetorical pressure depends partly on discursive hygiene and other-
knowledge. Indeed, the interlocutor may draw on discursive hygiene to gain knowledge 
of the person’s inferential commitments whereby she may identify those emotional 
appeals most likely to generate rhetorical pressure on the person’s beliefs, attitudes or 
reasons.  
                                                        
10 Notably, Stout suggests that interlocutors call attention to the role which non-discursive factors play in upstream 
belief-formation. For an audience of mis- or well-intentioned opponents, this includes the distinction between 
genders and its importance to the division of labor and inheritance rules (pp. 533-534). That said, changes in the 
social structure over time may further dialogue more than discursive tactics employed by public philosophy. 
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Such emotional appeals might consist in the exchange of “moral perceptions”. Stout 
(2004) scrutinizes one such exchange in the Edmund Burke-Thomas Paine controversy 
over democracy and custom (pp. 216-224). Whereas Burke paints for readers a vivid 
word-picture of Marie Antoinette’s suffering at revolutionary hands, Paine counters with 
a detailed account of the poor’s miserable living conditions. Through an intimation of 
their readers’ rational commitments, both Burke and Paine were able noninferentially to 
lead readers to their own inferential connections concerning what constituted proper 
treatment of the parties involved. While the emotional attitudes constitutive of moral 
perception are “noninferential, they are inferentially connected to moral passions, like 
awe and pity, and the actions for which they serve as warrant” (p. 217). Put differently, 
inferential relations unearthed by discursive hygiene may allow us to get a discursive grip 
on non-discursive factors underlying beliefs, attitudes and reasons.  
4. Conclusion 
After outlining two standard pictures of neoliberal public philosophy, I followed how 
Leiter’s two paradoxes, through emotivism and tribalism, undercut those pictures across 
two discursive sites. This gave rise to a revised, “lucid” picture of public philosophy about 
which I pressed questions concerning its empirical grounding and its scope. Finally, I 
illustrated two positive discursive tactics from Stout’s work: pressure on the person’s self-
image and appeal to “moral perceptions”. In the end, I concluded that, even if emotivism 
and tribalism are principally constitutive of attitude- and belief-formation, this does not 
preclude their responsiveness to the right kinds of reasons, for which “discursive hygiene” 
may yet serve a purpose.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 My thanks to the audience for helpful questions, comments and pushback. 
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